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UK Energy in a Global Context
One of the key objectives of the UK Energy 
Research Centre’s research during the past few 
years has been to explore in more detail the 
global context for energy that UK energy policies 
will need to take into account, if they are to be 
successful.
UKERC’s global energy research has been brought 
together in a major new book: Global Energy: Issues, 
Potentials and Policy Implications which will be 
published by Oxford University Press in 2014.
The book lays out clearly the global context within 
which the supply and use of energy in the UK 
seems likely to be situated over the next three or 
four decades. This report complements the book, 
and discusses the implications of global energy 
trends for the UK. It elaborates the options and 
choices for the UK in the light of UK energy issues 
and trends, and current energy infrastructures, 
markets and regulation. It also discusses the 
policies that are intended to determine the 
direction in which they develop.
This report draws especially on UKERC’s research 
and outputs from the last five years. Although 
the choice of themes within the report has been 
influenced by the desire to showcase key UKERC 
research, the aim is also to present a clear picture 
of the options and choices facing UK policy makers 
and other stakeholders (including the public).
There are, of course, still many unresolved 
uncertainties that will affect how these options 
and choices develop and play out in the years 
ahead. Many of these are explored in detail in 
a companion report: UK Energy Strategies under 
Uncertainty that UKERC is publishing alongside this 
one.
This report covers issues that are of current or 
future foreseeable importance, with a particular 
emphasis on those that have a strong global 
dimension.
The report starts with a very brief summary of the 
global context for energy (section 1), before briefly 
linking together the major issues affecting UK 
energy choices (section 2), and exploring through 
futures scenarios how these choices might play 
out in the years to 2050 (section 3). Section 4 
then covers the major issues in more detail: the 
potential drivers of UK energy demand; how key 
components of the UK’s energy supply could evolve 
(with a focus on natural gas security and the role 
of innovation in low-carbon technologies); how 
public attitudes and values could shape the future 
direction of the UK energy system; how energy 
markets in the UK could evolve, in the context of 
developments within the EU; and what the impacts 
of energy system change might be on energy costs 
and bills, and on national and global ecosystem 
services.
Acknowledgements and thanks are due to the 
named authors of each of the sections of this 
report, to the UK Research Councils that fund 
UKERC through the Research Councils’ Energy 
Programme, and to the many other individuals and 
organisations that have contributed to UKERC’s 
research.
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Energy underpins almost every human activity 
and in 2009 accounted for 3.6 per cent of economic 
activity in OECD countries reporting this data 
(OECD, 2011). Liquid petroleum products enable 
global trade and commerce at the local, national 
and international levels. Electricity powers lighting 
systems, office machinery, domestic appliances 
and electronic goods, as well as enhancing comfort 
levels in hotter climates, while a shifting balance 
of fossil fuels and electricity maintains comfort for 
people living in colder climates. The manufacturing 
industry depends on the supply of energy. 
The energy sector provides major business 
opportunities ranging from the extraction of 
mineral energy resources, harvesting renewable 
energy from sun, wind and water, transforming 
energy in power stations and petroleum refineries, 
and marketing energy to consumers while 
potentially helping them use that energy efficiently 
through energy service business models.
Primary energy resources are unevenly distributed 
round the globe and their exploitation, especially 
of globally traded fossil fuels such as oil, is 
intimately related to economic development in 
a number of countries. Those countries that are 
not well endowed with energy resources are often 
sensitive to their exposure to imports and their 
potential vulnerability to supply interruption.
Given the unique role that energy plays, 
policymakers have neither wanted nor have they 
been able to play a detached role. For a variety 
of reasons, they have intervened to incentivise 
or discourage specific forms of energy, promote 
energy efficiency and conservation, regulate 
natural monopolies and market power where it is 
deemed to be excessive, regulate environmental 
impacts, set the rules for spatial planning, and 
stimulate and direct technological innovation. 
Internationally, energy is the subject of diplomacy 
both among and between producer and consumer 
nations.
Global Energy: Key Issues and Trends
by Jim Skea and Paul Ekins
The energy trilemma
The energy policy challenge is often framed as 
a ‘trilemma’ – a balancing of three main policy 
drivers which are in tension as often as they 
reinforce each other. Although the term ‘trilemma’ 
is recent, the basic concept of a triangle of forces 
shaping policy trade-offs goes back decades 
(McGowan, 1989).
The first policy driver concerns the cost of energy 
to consumers and its impact on a country’s 
competitiveness, now frequently captured in the 
short-hand term ‘affordability’. Major shifts in the 
price of globally traded forms of energy can have 
significant macro-economic consequences for both 
consumers and producers. The oil crises of the 
1970s still cast a long shadow over energy policy-
making.
The second driver concerns the management 
of the environmental impacts of energy. The 
energy sector makes a disproportionately 
large contribution to environmental problems. 
For example, it accounts for two thirds of the 
radiative forcing from human activities leading 
to climate change. Climate change is a dominant 
concern both nationally and internationally in 
current discussions of the energy sector. Energy 
activities also still contribute disproportionately 
to air pollution problems such as acid rain and 
urban smog in low-income countries, although 
technological solutions have addressed the worst 
of these problems in most developed countries. 
There are rising concerns about the interaction of 
energy activity with water and land especially if 
the use of biomass for energy develops.
The third driver is ‘energy security’. This is perhaps 
the most nebulous of the three drivers. The term 
can be used to refer to access to and the price of 
primary energy resources (e.g. oil, natural gas) 
as well as to the availability of plant (e.g. power 
stations) that converts energy into a form suitable 
for consumption (e.g. electricity). Recent research 
has made considerable progress in structuring 
thinking about energy security (Mitchell et al., 
2013). Energy security can be threatened by natural 
disasters, economic disturbances, politically 
the wind, waves, tides or sun. These are then 
technologically transformed, converted and 
transmitted or distributed to businesses and 
households where they are used by a wide variety 
of technologies to generate the energy services 
(warmth, ‘coolth’, light, mobility, and power for 
information, entertainment and appliances), the 
demands for which drive the use of energy. The 
technologies, of both supply and demand, are 
continuously subject to processes of innovation 
and technical change that find new uses for energy, 
as well improving the efficiency and performance 
with which energy is produced and energy services 
are delivered.
This innovation – the development and wide 
deployment of new technologies – is essential if 
the environmental dimension of the trilemma is 
to be adequately addressed while also meeting 
current consumer expectations in relation to 
energy security and affordability (see section 4.6). 
Stimulating this innovation and technological 
change in a cost-effective way requires a 
government to strike a sensitive balance between 
giving economy-wide signals of the direction in 
which it wishes the energy system to develop (e.g. 
through carbon taxes if the objective is a low-
carbon energy system), developing portfolios of 
different energy technologies, using different fuels, 
hoping that diversity in supply can enhance energy 
security, and encouraging winning technologies to 
be installed at scale, in order to reap the benefits 
of experience and economies of large-scale 
deployment.
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motivated supply interruptions (whether inside 
a country or internationally) or simply through 
inadequate planning. Memories of the 1970s’ oil 
crises mean that an association is often made 
between the reduction of import dependency 
and the promotion of energy security. Though 
the evidence for this link is tenuous at best (e.g. 
Stern, 2004), the notion helps to legitimise political 
arguments that are sometimes made for more 
energy independence.
Different countries have different options, and are 
likely to make different choices, in relation to these 
issues, depending on their energy history, culture, 
resource endowments and international relations. 
The choices are essentially political, although there 
are obviously certain irreducible requirements for 
fuels, technologies and infrastructure if demands 
for energy services are to be met. The choices made 
will play out differently in terms of energy security, 
environmental impact and cost. Because of the 
substantial costs of the technologies, and the long-
lived nature of much of the infrastructure, the 
economic and political consequences of making 
the wrong choices are potentially enormous.
The energy system
Figure 1.1 is a schematic illustration of an energy 
system, which takes energy resources from, 
and is responsible for emissions to, the natural 
environment. The resources may be mined, drilled, 
pumped, grown, felled, using various technologies 
that produce primary fuels, or captured from 
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While Figure 1.1 shows a largely technical 
representation of the energy system, energy 
systems are seamless webs of connected technical, 
institutional and social components. Changing any 
part of the system is likely to have consequences 
elsewhere. The objective of decarbonising the 
energy system implies its fundamental remaking, 
but system complexity and heterogeneity 
mean that no single optimal pathway can be 
confidently defined to respond to this challenge. 
Multiple possible pathways exist for an affordable 
transition. Realising any one of these pathways 
faces numerous practical challenges and requires 
strong, sustained and adaptive policies
(e.g. Skea et al., 2011).
Finally, it should be borne in mind in any 
discussion of these technologies, that institutions, 
and lifestyles and human behaviours, will play 
a crucial role in influencing whether these 
technologies are deployed and used, and how. This 
is especially true for institutions, such as markets 
and regulatory structures, on the supply side, and 
for lifestyles and human behaviour, such as how 
people engage with technologies, on the demand 
side, but both institutions and behaviour are 
important in any consideration of how an energy 
system operates and develops.
In this context it should always be remembered 
that very often the cheapest and most secure way 
of meeting energy service demands is to increase 
the efficiency with which energy is used, such 
that any given level of energy services can be 
delivered with less energy supply. Allied to changes 
in lifestyle and behaviour that reduce energy 
demand, and demand responses to the availability 
of energy that are facilitated by the information 
technologies incorporated in smart grids and 
smart meters, the importance and potential of the 
demand side in addressing the energy trilemma 
has never been greater. Failing to give it adequate 
consideration in policy can result in energy 
systems being more costly, less secure and more 
environmentally destructive than they need to be.
There are few more important tasks for 
government than successfully addressing the 
many and complex interacting aspects of the 
energy trilemma, such that its citizens and 
businesses know that they can meet their energy 
service demands when they want to, in a way that 
they can afford, without disrupting the climate or 
polluting local air. UKERC has generated numerous 
important insights into how these goals can be 
achieved, many of which are identified and covered 
in the chapters that follow.
Figure 1.1. Schematic Illustration of an Energy System
Source: Adapted from Agnolucci and Ekins, 2007
Wind
Solar
Waves
Tides
Fossil Fuels
[Coal, Oil, Gas]
Uranium
Biomass
Water
Wind
Solar
Wind
Solar
On-site conversion
[e.g. CHP]
Energy Demand 
Technologies
Energy Services [e.g. heat, light, power, mobility]
Non-Energy Production Sectors
Technologies for 
Energy Extraction/
Production
[e.g. mining, drilling, 
pumping, farming, 
foresty equipment]
Technologies 
for Energy 
Transformation 
[e.g. power generation]
Conversion
[e.g. oil refineries]
Transmission/
Distribution
Infrastructure
Innovation Technical 
Change
[R&D, Demonstration, 
Diffusion]
Environment
Natural Resources Emissions to air, land, water
Household Energy 
Conversion 
Technologies
[e.g. micro-CHP, 
solar thermal 
panels, household 
wind, solar PV]
Energy Demand 
Technologies
[e.g. heating 
systems, buildings, 
appliances, light 
bulbs and cars]
Energy Services
[e.g. heat, power, 
light and mobility]
2
8
UKERC Research Report
UK Energy in a Global Context
9
There are numerous options on both the demand 
and supply sides whereby the UK can achieve 
its objectives of a clean, secure and affordable 
low-carbon energy system. However, there are 
profound uncertainties associated with each of 
these options. Where possible and appropriate, 
these need to be reduced or better understood as 
soon as possible to reduce the chance of making 
inappropriate or unproductive investments.
Energy demand options
In considering energy options it is always worth 
starting with energy demand, which determines 
how much supply, and what kind of supply, is 
required. The level of demand will depend on the 
growth over time of the UK population and the 
number of households; the efficiency with which 
energy services are delivered; and the energy 
intensity of the activities in which people are 
engaged. The possible evolution of these variables 
to 2050 covers a very wide range. Both population 
and the number of households seem likely to 
grow significantly, but there is very great scope for 
increased efficiency in the delivery of most energy 
services (IEA, 2012), and it may well be that the 
recent levelling off in the growth of household 
demand for energy, and in the consumption of 
road fuels (DECC, 2013a), is indicative of both 
increased efficiency and moderation in the growth 
of demand for energy services. The rising energy 
prices of recent years are also likely to have more 
than offset any rebound effect (Sorrell, 2007) from 
increased energy efficiency.
The need for energy, and especially electricity, 
capacity could also be profoundly affected by 
the extent to which smart meters, smart grids 
(Balta-Ozkan et al., 2014) and new energy storage 
technologies facilitate load smoothing and the 
reduced provision of peak and back-up capacity. 
However, it should be remembered that the 
decarbonisation of the energy system permits 
only a relatively small role in the future for 
internal combustion engines using fossil fuels, 
however efficient they become, and practically 
no role at all for the heating of homes by natural 
gas. Instead, it seems very likely that key new 
demand technologies will be electric vehicles (with 
or without fuel cells), which could also be used 
for electricity storage/load smoothing, and heat 
pumps, both of which would use almost totally 
decarbonised electricity, the provision of which 
would therefore be likely to increase, despite its 
much more efficient use.
Another possibility, extensively installed in Japan, 
but less so currently in Europe, is the provision 
of heat to households through micro-combined 
heat and power (CHP) hydrogen fuel cells, with the 
hydrogen initially produced by natural gas, but 
ultimately by low-carbon electricity. However, all of 
battery electric vehicles, heat pumps and fuel cells 
are in substantial need of further development, 
in particular leading to cost reductions, and 
their mass deployment raises important issues 
of consumer and public acceptability, as well as 
new infrastructure requirements, for example, the 
strengthening of electricity distribution grids.
Energy supply options
Turning to supply, the most pressing issue 
related to reducing carbon emissions is the 
decarbonisation of electricity, so that it may 
be used to supply low-carbon transport and 
residential heat, through the electric vehicles, 
heat pumps and hydrogen mentioned above. Such 
decarbonisation depends on the development and 
deployment at scale of some combination of four 
potentially important low-carbon options: large-
scale renewables, small-scale renewables, nuclear 
power, and carbon capture and storage (CCS).
None of these options can simply be rolled out in 
an unproblematic manner. All are currently more 
expensive than the fossil fuel-based technologies 
they need to replace, and therefore require policy 
support. In addition to cost, renewables raise 
additional issues of incentives, deployment, grid 
connection, planning and public acceptability, 
market structure and the existence or otherwise of 
domestic supply chains and storage technologies 
to address the intermittency associated with some 
UK Energy and Emissions:
Options and Decision Timelines
by Paul Ekins
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renewable energy sources. Nuclear power raises 
additional issues relating to the demonstration of 
a new generation of designs, public acceptability 
and risks associated with possible accidents, 
attack, weapons proliferation, waste, safety, and 
decommissioning. Finally, CCS has yet to be 
demonstrated anywhere commercially at scale, 
so that profound uncertainties remain associated 
with its feasibility, cost, and the risks of leakage 
from storage and associated liabilities.
Bioenergy is a renewable energy source that can 
be used to generate power, raise heat or fuel 
vehicles, but it also raises a host of thorny issues 
(Slade et al., 2011). The extent to which it reduces 
carbon emissions depends on how the biomass is 
grown, and some means of biomass production 
seem to produce more carbon emissions than coal. 
Producing biomass also raises important questions 
about competing land uses, where bioenergy may 
either substitute for food production or displace 
it, resulting in deforestation and the reduction of 
biodiversity. Finally, as with all issues relating to 
land, producing bioenergy raises important social 
questions of power, livelihoods, ownership and 
control in those countries where the production 
takes place.
The internationalisation of energy
Internationalisation is another trend that increases 
the complexity of contemporary energy issues. Of 
course, oil has always been traded globally, but this 
now also applies to bioenergy (both solid biomass 
for combustion and liquid biofuels for transport) 
and increasingly to natural gas. Although natural 
gas markets are currently mainly regional rather 
than global, the growth of shale gas extraction in 
the US, and the possibility of widespread shale 
gas extraction elsewhere, including Europe and 
the UK within it, and the development of liquid 
natural gas (LNG) technology, mean that global 
gas markets may develop. Regional markets in 
electricity are also developing, especially in Europe 
(ECF, 2010), in part at least to respond to the 
variability of renewables by integrating electricity 
grids over a wider area. The decarbonisation 
imperative is adding another global dimension 
to energy, as carbon markets become established 
internationally, while fears that reducing carbon 
emissions may lead to negative impacts on 
industrial competitiveness has led to renewed 
consideration of the possibility of border tax 
adjustments.
Energy technologies themselves are also part of 
the global market. Countries are torn between 
conflicting desires, on the one hand to participate 
in global networks of research, innovation and 
technology development, and on the other to 
gain national competitive advantage from the 
technologies that result from such processes. This 
results in an uneasy balance between competition 
and cooperation in matters relating to energy 
technologies, while least developed countries 
demand concessional conditions for technology 
transfer to them, to permit them to achieve 
economic development with reduced levels of 
carbon emissions.  
The energy transition 2020-2050
The fact that much energy infrastructure is long 
lived and expensive, and that different energy 
options require different kinds and amounts of 
infrastructure, means that the transition to a 
low-carbon energy system needs to be carefully 
sequenced, in the UK as elsewhere. In the years to 
2020, the emphasis needs to be on getting initial 
deployment at scale for those technologies that 
have already been successfully demonstrated, for 
example, in meeting the UK’s renewable energy 
targets through onshore and offshore wind, and 
biomass, and seeing the extent to which the 
potential cost reductions from this deployment 
actually materialise.
This is also the period in which the performance of 
other supply-side options will need to be clarified: 
the first new nuclear power station will need to be 
well on the way to completion if its role after 2020 
is to be assured; the first demonstration projects 
for CCS will need to be operational so that there is 
more clarity about their feasibility than currently 
(Watson et al., 2012). Much will depend in these 
cases on the successful incentivisation of these 
technologies through the Electricity Market Reform 
put in place in the Energy Act 2013.
In addition, the trajectory of demand reduction 
will have to be clarified. Has household demand 
for heating and transport stabilised, so that further 
efficiency improvements will reduce energy use, or 
does the most that can be expected from energy 
efficiency remain a growth rate of energy demand 
that is lower than it otherwise would be? With 
the roll out of smart meters to households and 
businesses, it is also to be hoped that the extent 
of the benefits from demand response in reducing 
peak power demands will be clearer.
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By 2020, too, it should be clear whether there is 
a take up of electric vehicles – hybrid, battery 
or fuel cell – that promises the mass shift to 
this form of mobility in subsequent decades, or 
whether motorists remain attached to the internal 
combustion engines that have served them so 
well in the 20th century and continue to do so.  
Similarly it should be clearer whether heat pumps 
and fuel cell micro-CHP are beginning to mount 
a credible challenge to gas boilers, and whether 
much more efficient new buildings and more 
effective refurbishments can be implemented than 
in the past.
Finally, 2020 is the year in which a new global 
agreement on climate change is due to come into 
effect. How far and how fast the UK is prepared to 
decarbonise thereafter is likely to be significantly 
affected by the nature and ambition of that 
agreement, the framework for which needs to be 
put in place in Paris at the 2015 Conference of 
the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.
Figure 2.1 shows the pipeline of selected energy 
technologies and indicates the progress of these 
technologies that is required by 2020, if the deeper 
decarbonisation necessary in following decades 
to limit climate change is to be cost-effectively 
achieved. In reality, of course, innovation processes 
are not linear, but are subject to multiple 
complex feedbacks between the different stages 
of innovation (as described in section 4.3), so the 
figure should be interpreted as a snapshot of where 
different technologies were in 2010, and the kind of 
progress they would need to make by 2020 if they 
were going to contribute to the reduction of carbon 
emissions in subsequent decades, as is often 
envisaged in scenarios depicting the transition to 
low-carbon energy systems.
The picture that emerges from this discussion 
suggests that, during the 2020s, large-scale roll out 
of mature supply technologies that have already 
been demonstrated at scale will be required, to 
the extent required by the new demand patterns 
that should by then have become apparent. 
The electricity grid will have to have been 
substantially redesigned to effectively incorporate 
the intermittent, less flexible and decentralised 
low-carbon sources that will be needed by then to 
supply an increasing proportion, and by 2030 easily 
the majority, of UK electricity; the carbon intensity 
of which will need to be no more than 100gCO2 /
kWh, compared with around 500gCO2 /kWh in 
2000.
There will assuredly be some scope for re-thinking 
or re-designing some options in light of the lessons 
and experiences learned from the early and pre-
2020s; for example, whether the likely long-term 
vehicle future is likely to be driven predominantly 
by batteries or hydrogen fuel cells. Another major 
issue that will need resolution in these years is the 
future of the natural gas grid; whether it will be 
totally converted to low-carbon gas, which could 
be a mixture of biogas and hydrogen, whether it 
will be broken up into ‘hydrogen communities’ 
at the distribution grid level, or whether it will be 
entirely abandoned in favour of heating largely by 
heat pumps and biomass district heating. By the 
end of the decade the scope for large-scale changes 
in such matters will be much reduced if the deep 
reductions in carbon emissions that are required 
from 2030 to 2050 are to be achieved without 
the costs of un- or under-utilised equipment and 
stranded infrastructure assets.
By 2050, electricity will need to be almost 
completely decarbonised, and could be 
contributing on a large-scale to heat and transport, 
as well as powering appliances and information 
and communication technologies. Buildings will 
be using much less energy for heating and this 
will come from a mixture of heat pumps, district 
heating and fuel cell micro-CHP. Vehicles will have 
very low emissions, and are likely to be mainly 
ultra-efficient and powered by fuel cells and/
or batteries. And industry will also be using low-
carbon fuels or fossil fuels with CCS. More detailed 
scenarios of what a low-carbon UK might look like 
in mid-century with such changes are sketched out 
in the next section.
UKERC Research Report
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Figure 2.1. Pipeline of selected energy technologies showing progress required by 2020 
Source: Adapted from Energy Research Partnership, 2010
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The analysis in this section concentrates on an 
emissions scenario, produced with the global 
energy system/integrated assessment model 
TIAM-UCL (McGlade & Ekins, 2014), that provides 
a 60 per cent probability of limiting the average 
global surface warming to 2oC. If this is to occur, 
it is essential for developed countries, including 
the UK, to lead in ensuring global emissions peak 
before 2030. However, delaying the peak until 
then will require drastic year-on-year emissions 
reductions (an average of 6 per cent per year) 
that are generally greater than the rates thought 
able to be sustained alongside further economic 
growth (estimated to be between around 3-4 per 
cent annual reduction). The results here therefore 
suggest that the UK should push for the agreement 
of a binding global treaty that leads to a peak in 
emissions within the next ten years.
If an agreement were to be enacted, and 
systematically implemented, that resulted in 
global emissions peaking in 2020, results suggest 
that per-capita GHG emissions in 2050 in the UK, 
including all international aviation and shipping, 
fall to 2.5 tCO2-eq per-capita. This is a drop of 80 
per cent from current levels and results in per-
capita emissions lower than those currently in 
Africa. This assumes that there is an overarching 
global effort to meet the 2oC target, without any 
regional emissions reductions based on income 
levels or historical responsibility. Emissions 
therefore fall in all regions, irrespective of income 
levels and development status, from 2020 onwards. 
However, since it is more expensive to decarbonise 
some sectors in the UK than mitigate a similar 
level of emissions in other regions, per-capita 
emissions in the UK also remain slightly above the 
global average of 2 tCO2-eq per-capita.
Conversely, if all attempts at emissions mitigation 
were to be abandoned, resulting in an expected 
average surface warming of around 4oC by 2100, 
per-capita emissions in the UK may be expected to 
grow, though by only 5 per cent from the levels in 
2010. This is one of the most modest increases seen 
in any region (for example, per-capita emissions 
in the United States and China increase by 15 per 
cent and 70 per cent respectively).
This suggests that pursuing a low-carbon pathway 
would be less of a burden on the UK than for many 
other regions, which is a further strong reason for 
the UK to take a leading role in the effort to limit 
the global temperature increase.
In the cost-optimal 2oC pathway, results suggest 
that the global CO2 price in 2050 is likely to 
range from $120 - $650/tCO2 (in 2005 US$), with 
an absolute minimum 2020 CO2 price of $50/
tCO2. This is around £35/tCO2 in current prices, 
illustrating the importance of the carbon floor 
price announced by the UK Treasury in 2011. 
This had been due to rise to £30 by 2020 but now 
seems unlikely to do so, given the decision in 
the UK’s 2014 Budget to freeze the UK’s carbon 
price support element at its 2015 level. It is to be 
hoped that this decision will be revisited, and the 
carbon price floor raised, if an ambitious global 
agreement on climate change emerges from the 
2015 negotiations in Paris. However, as explained 
and emphasised in section 4.3, it should also 
be recognised that even quite a high carbon 
price will not be enough by itself to bring about 
the innovation and deployment of low-carbon 
technologies that is now required by the UK’s 
carbon targets.
If it does follow the cost-optimal 2oC pathway, 
in parallel with the global pattern, the UK 
decarbonises its electricity sector first and to the 
greatest degree. After 2010 (the beginning of the 
period examined here), no new major unabated 
coal plants are constructed and indeed there 
is negligible unabated coal generation from 
2030 onwards. Some unabated gas turbines are 
constructed but in later periods these are used 
at very low load factors (15-20 per cent). Gas 
primarily acts as back-up to the intermittent 
renewables and to support the increased levels 
of generation needed in winter months, which is 
required because 80 per cent of residential and 
commercial heat has been electrified by 2050.
UK Energy Futures in a Global 
Context: Achieving the 2°C Target
by Christophe McGlade
UKERC Research Report
UK Energy in a Global Context
15
There are, however, 45 GW of both gas and coal 
plants equipped with carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) constructed between 2025 and 2050. This 
underlines how important it is to demonstrate, 
commercialise and deploy CCS expediently if the 
UK is to meet its emissions mitigation goals in 
the most cost-effective manner. With a continued 
growth in renewables out to 2050 (at least 2GW of 
wind and solar are installed annually), the carbon 
intensity of electricity generation drops to around 
50gCO2 per kWh produced by 2035, staying below 
this level for the remainder of the modelling 
period.
There is a much greater utilisation of bio-energy 
resources than at present, which grow from 
around 2 per cent to over 15 per cent of primary 
energy consumption by 2050. Even though there 
is a high level of demand in all other regions, 
the UK imports the majority of the bio-energy it 
consumes. However, given the difficulty and costs 
of transporting solid biomass or bio-crops, it is 
predominantly imported as refined products. The 
conversion process for domestically produced 
bio-energy is used with CCS, with the resultant 
products primarily used to decarbonise the 
transport sector (especially aviation).
Finally, the scenario suggests that there is a good 
potential for natural gas to act as a transition 
fuel to a low-carbon energy system on a global 
scale, with gas substituting for coal; this result 
is repeated on a modest scale for the UK, in 
that UK gas consumption before 2050 in a 
scenario consistent with a 2oC temperature rise 
(Figure 3.1) is greater than one leading to much 
higher temperature rise. There are a number 
of important caveats to this, however, not least 
that any increases in gas consumption cannot 
occur alongside an increase in coal consumption. 
Furthermore, CCS technologies are essential if 
there is to be anything other than a limited long-
term role for gas in a future UK low-carbon energy 
system.
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Figure 3.1. UK gas consumption scenarios to 2050
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This section explores some of the major challenges 
facing the development of the UK energy system 
in coming decades. First, section 4.1 discusses 
UK energy demand in the context of the low-
carbon scenario described in the previous section, 
because this is why the energy system exists in 
the first place. While UK energy demand is partly 
influenced by global trends, it is mostly determined 
by more ‘local’ factors. Energy supply is more 
influenced by global factors, as well exemplified 
by natural gas, the focus of section 4.2. Natural 
gas is particularly important given the UK’s shift 
from net exporter to net importer in recent years, 
the rise of shale gas production in the US, and the 
possible production of shale gas in the UK and 
in Europe more widely. Innovation, discussed in 
section 4.3, is also globally influenced, especially 
when it comes to supply side technologies and 
networks, but also with respect to end use 
technologies.
Both supply and demand, and the way in which 
energy is organised, delivered and paid for is 
influenced to a large extent by public attitudes 
and the values that underpin them. This is the 
subject of section 4.4. This then leads logically to 
section 4.5 which considers the energy markets 
and networks through which the UK and wider EU 
energy systems are organised.  There then follows 
a discussion in section 4.6 of the major influences 
on energy costs and bills which are currently being 
delivered by UK energy markets, and how these 
might develop in the future.
Finally, although much of the environmental 
discussion in this report has focused on climate 
change as a result of carbon emissions from 
the energy system, this is by no means the only 
environmental impact of the energy system. 
Section 4.7 looks at the wider impacts of national 
and global energy trends on ecosystem services, 
widening the analysis to include both the local 
and global environmental effects of, and potenially 
leading to constraints on, the UK energy system.
4.1 UK energy demand 
by Nick Eyre
Key drivers of demand
Whereas UK energy supply is dominated by 
internationally traded fuels and increasingly global 
technology markets for conversion technologies, 
many aspects of energy demand are less obviously 
internationally influenced. With the exception of 
international shipping and aviation, UK energy 
demand is, by definition, physically located within 
the UK, although many of the products consumed 
in the UK may have been made abroad, with 
consequent carbon emissions in other countries 
(Baiocchi & Minx, 2010). Many drivers of energy 
demand – income, GDP, land use planning, many 
building techniques and most energy-using 
practices – have strongly national characteristics. 
However, it would be a mistake to conceive of 
a simple dichotomy in which ‘supply is global’ 
and ‘demand is national’. In an open economy 
such as the UK’s, the main economic drivers of 
energy service demands – population, economic 
activity and energy prices – are increasingly 
affected by international factors; many energy-
using technologies are traded across countries; 
and globalisation means that even changes in 
energy-using practices observed in recent decades 
have been affected by the same trends towards 
consumerism seen in the rest of the developed, 
and increasingly in the developing, worlds.
Some of the key policy drivers of UK energy 
demand have come from EU level, both by direct 
regulation of products and through Directives 
that drive targets and other policies. The extent to 
which this will persist will depend on a number of 
factors, most importantly any specific targets for 
energy demand or efficiency in the EU 2030 energy 
package. National policy, however, remains critical 
in a number of areas, notably land use, building 
and fiscal policies, as well as the regulation of the 
energy sector.
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UK energy demand has fallen in recent years.  
Ensuring that this trend continues is likely to be 
important for meeting the objectives of carbon 
emissions reduction and energy security at 
reasonable cost.  The implications of global drivers 
across the main energy-using sectors of the UK 
economy leads to the challenges set out below.
Industry
The main energy-using industrial technologies 
are global with, in many cases, international 
corporations owning plant in the same sector 
across the world. There is still significant scope for 
increases in industrial energy efficiency. However, 
much has already been achieved, especially in the 
energy-intensive sectors (Hammond & Norman, 
2012), partly driven by a stronger public policy in 
the 1970s and 1980s (Griffin et al., 2012) and the 
scope for improvement of current processes is 
lower than in other sectors. Industrial demand for 
fossil fuel energy therefore remains a stubborn 
residual source of carbon emissions in many future 
scenarios.
Apart from CCS, the only prospect of major 
emissions reduction is through process or 
product change. It is difficult to envisage this 
being achieved solely within the UK, or without 
a significant increase in energy or carbon prices.  
In some sub-sectors (notably aluminium) energy 
prices are a determining factor of investment 
location; in others there is a smaller effect, but 
concerns about relative industrial competitiveness 
are clearly a major driver of wider worries about 
energy affordability. Securing substantial carbon 
emission reductions without global agreement or 
loss of UK manufacturing competitiveness remains 
a serious challenge.
Transport
Demand for transport is a strong function of land 
use patterns, aspirations to mobility and social 
attitudes to lower energy transport modes such as 
public transport, cycling and walking 
(Anable et al., 2012). Delivering changes to these 
modes will require sustained investment in 
public transport, but also a break from historical 
patterns of suburbanisation and increased travel.  
While there are uniquely national drivers of 
demand, most visions for high-quality/low-energy 
change that are beginning to influence UK policy 
and practice come from overseas, notably from 
elsewhere in Northern Europe.
In contrast the vehicles that dominate current 
transport use, notably cars, are widely traded 
across national borders. EU level regulation of fuel 
efficiency has been the key driver of improved 
efficiency in the UK, assisted by taxation on fuel, 
vehicles and company car use. However, there is 
still huge scope for progress and the technology 
market is global. Rising oil prices and energy 
security concerns have increased attention to 
vehicle efficiency globally, with improvements 
driven by a combination of engine performance, 
reduced weight and better aerodynamics.
Asian-based manufacturers have an important 
market share and have played a key role in 
introducing new technologies, notably electric 
hybrids. The key future challenge will be to 
maintain this progress towards vehicle efficiency 
and electrification, with innovation in the UK’s 
automotive manufacturing sector being supported 
by government policy to provide a domestic market 
for low-carbon transport options 
(Brand et al., 2013).  
 
Buildings 
Electrical appliances, including lights, play 
an increasing role in energy use in buildings.  
The market is, in many ways similar to that 
for vehicles: technology is global and rapidly 
developing, products are widely traded and EU 
regulation is the key driver of efficiency in the UK 
market. For the most rapidly changing product 
categories (e.g. in information and communication 
technology (ICT)), timely EU regulation has proved 
difficult and more global drivers have been 
important, notably the US ‘Energy Star’ standard 
and the IEA ‘One Watt’ goal for standby power 
consumption.
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Globally negotiated or adopted standards may 
be expected to become increasingly important. 
UK policy can help drive adoption, but currently 
electricity demand reduction has limited policy 
support compared to low-carbon generation 
(Eyre, 2013).
Buildings themselves are obviously not traded 
across borders in the same way. Vernacular 
architectural traditions remain more important; 
regulations are national (although increasingly 
EU policy driven) and the trades that dominate 
the residential construction and refurbishment 
sectors are nationally or locally based (Janda & 
Parag, 2012). Home energy use is therefore less 
susceptible to global influence, and there is a major 
challenge for the sector to adopt more advanced 
insulation and ventilation practices, e.g. from 
continental Europe. Unfortunately, recent changes 
to policy have resulted in a reduction in energy 
efficiency activity (Rosenow & Eyre, 2013).
The commercial building market is more globalised 
with an international supply chain and design 
standards. This aids globalisation of technology, 
even where climatic differences lead to this being 
energy-inefficient (Janda, 2011), e.g. through the 
unnecessary adoption of air conditioning in the UK, 
so the challenge is to avoid a continuing trend to 
over-conditioning.
Networks
Energy supply networks to final users play a key 
role in driving end use technologies and practices. 
In the 20th century, the UK developed universal 
access to electricity and a very extensive natural 
gas network. Arguably neither is now fit for 
purpose for the challenges of modern energy 
systems. There is broad agreement that some 
electrification of heating through heat pumps will 
be required, although the practicability of very 
extensive change remains debated (Fawcett, 2011).
Advocates of alternative approaches point to much 
better developed heat networks in other northern 
countries, but this also remains a contentious 
topic, with unresolved issues about the cost 
effectiveness of heat networks for low-energy 
buildings and the choice of their fuels in a low-
carbon economy.
A move to smart grids has begun in the UK, 
as in many other countries. While there is a 
clear political and industrial commitment, with 
potential benefits for suppliers, consumers and 
network operators, there are significant concerns 
around data privacy and management.
The most significant benefits are contingent on 
much higher market penetrations of intermittent 
renewables and new electricity loads. In delivering 
on this challenge the UK may be able to learn from 
countries with earlier high penetration of wind and 
solar.
4.2 UK gas security – shale gas, LNG and 
gas markets 
by Mike Bradshaw
In the 1990s the UK embarked upon a ‘dash for gas’ 
as gas production from the UK continental shelf 
(UKCS) provided an abundant fuel for new power 
stations, to supply industry, and heat homes. The 
construction of the interconnector (IUK) between 
Bacton and Zebrugge (in Belgium) allowed for 
exports to continental Europe, as well as imports. 
Demand grew rapidly. The UK’s gas production 
peaked in 2000 and in 2004 the UK became a net 
importer of natural gas (see Figure 4.1). Since then, 
as domestic production has continued to decline, 
import dependence has rapidly increased. In 2013, 
according to preliminary data, nearly 48 per cent of 
UK gas consumption was met by imports.
Security in diversity
The UK benefits from a well-developed gas import 
infrastructure with 100 billion cubic metres a year 
(bcma) of pipeline capacity and 50 bcma of LNG 
terminal capacity, against domestic demand of 80-
90 bcma.
In addition to UKCS production, the UK is 
increasingly served by imports from three sources: 
first, from the Norwegian continental shelf, via 
a pipeline system that supplies gas directly to 
UK consumers; second, from continental Europe 
via the IUK and the BBL pipeline that connects 
Balgzand in the Netherlands to Bacton; and third, 
from three LNG terminals – the Isle of Grain in 
Essex (National Grid), the Dragon LNG (BG and 
Petronas) and the South Hook (Qatar Petroleum 
International, ExxonMobil and Total). Each of these 
terminals has a distinct and different business 
model.
These details are important because they 
demonstrate the increasing globalisation of the 
UK’s gas supply. Thus, the interconnectors draw 
the UK into the European market, both in terms 
of price formation and regulation; while the 
development of LNG capacity draws the UK into an 
extended global supply chain.
As Table 4.1 demonstrates, the majority of the 
UK’s LNG cargoes have come from Qatar. The 
development of these new sources of supply have 
also required the National Grid to invest in new 
pipeline infrastructure as gas flows around the 
country have changed direction and have become 
more dynamic and complex. This diversity of UK 
sources of natural gas enhances UK gas security.
A deep and liquid market
The liberalisation of the UK’s natural gas industry 
in the 1990s resulted in the creation of the 
National Balancing Point (NBP). This is a virtual 
trading point for the sale, purchase and exchange 
of UK natural gas. The National Grid manages 
the physical expression of the NBP through the 
National Transmission System (NTS) that links 
physical gas suppliers to consumers. The natural 
gas price is formed through gas-to-gas competition 
in this virtual market. This is distinct from 
continental European gas markets where, until 
recently, price formation has been dominated by 
oil indexation and long-term contracts. The NBP 
is internationally recognised as a benchmark 
price as it is the deepest and most liquid market 
in Europe. This is a major source of resilience as 
it allows prices to attract gas to the UK in times 
of shortage. Equally, however, if prices are higher 
on the Continent, then gas will flow from the UK. 
Because of the UK’s ultimate dependence on gas 
imports, it would not be at all desirable for the UK 
Government to intervene in the market for energy 
security reasons.
One way that additional resilience could be 
provided would be to invest more in gas storage. 
By European standards the level of UK gas storage 
is low, but there is currently no business case to 
support additional investment and the government 
sees no justification to provide public money. The 
net result is that while a lot of new storage has 
planning permission, very little is being built. 
Consequently, short-term physical security issues – 
usually related to technical failures – are resolved 
via a higher price on the NBP that attracts more 
pipeline gas from Norway and Europe and LNG 
from global markets.
Globalising gas security
The geography of gas imports reveals two trends 
(Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). First, there is increasing 
capacity and diversity as new infrastructure has 
been added to the system. Second, of late, there 
has been a significant change in the volume and 
origin of the UK’s gas imports. The latter illustrates 
how developments elsewhere in the world impact 
on the UK’s gas security. 
The decision to develop new UK LNG capacity was 
taken well in advance of the shale gas revolution 
in North America. However, that import capacity 
became available just as LNG export capacity – 
particularly from Qatar – needed a new market. 
Thus, the UK became a major beneficiary of an 
LNG glut created by the loss of the US market. 
However, after the disaster at Fukushima, the 
global LNG market tightened as Japan sourced 
additional LNG supplies. The Japanese utility 
companies were willing to pay whatever price was 
needed to attract cargoes. Meanwhile, in Europe 
recession and growing renewable power generation 
depressed gas demand. The net result is that far 
fewer LNG cargoes have found their way to the UK.
At the same time, shale gas production in the US 
has displaced coal from the power generation mix 
and coal producers have sought to export that 
coal. Most recently, in the UK, the high price of 
gas relative to coal, and the low price of carbon, 
has meant that power generators have switched 
to coal. Consequently, late last year gas demand 
was back at 1995 levels. However, this unexpected 
and unwanted ‘dash for coal’ is unlikely to last, as 
coal power plants are closing in the face of EU air 
pollution controls. So what happens next?
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Pipeline Imports Liquified Natural Gas 
Imports
Total Gas 
Imports
Import 
Dependence
(% of demand)Belgium Netherlands Norway Qatar Total LNG
2000 270 - 1,031 - - 1,301 1
2001 367 - 1,158 - - 1,525 3
2002 611 - 3,392 - - 4,003 5
2003 401 - 6,327 - - 6,728 8
2004 2,339 - 8,460 - - 10,799 11
2005 2,203 - 11,305 - 500 14,008 17
2006 2,788 840 14,003 71 3,442 21,073 29
2007 593 7,107 20,339 247 1,403 29,442 35
2008 1,127 8,440 25,528 - 820 35,915 40
2009 728 6,475 23,478 5,627 10,127 40,808 49
2010 1,245 8,164 25,026 14,565 18,578 53,012 58
2011 368 6,447 21,203 21,153 24,827 52,846 54
2012 1,310 7,297 26,832 13,335 13,667 49,105 61
2013 p 3,307 7,804 27,866 8,607 9,278 48,255 58
% of total 
imports in 2013
6.9 16.2 57.7 17.8 19.2 100 n/a
p = preliminary
Source: DECC and National Grid
Table 4.1. The Geography of UK Gas Imports (million cubic metres), 2000-2013
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Uncertainty of future demand
Politicians tend to focus on rising import 
dependence and security of supply as dominant 
gas security concerns; the reality is that 
uncertainty about future demand poses a much 
greater threat. Natural gas will continue to have 
a major role in the UK’s energy mix; the key 
questions are how much gas, for how long?
The answers lie in a whole system analysis as 
natural gas, and its associated power generation 
capacity, currently seem the default cover for any 
failure to develop new base load (nuclear) and for 
the intermittency of renewable power generation. 
The Government’s Gas Generation Strategy 
(DECC, 2012b) seeks to ensure sufficient gas 
generation capacity in the future, but expects the 
load on that capacity to be much lower. However, 
current market conditions have resulted in existing 
capacity being mothballed and no appetite to 
invest in new capacity.
The real concern is that a failure to develop new 
nuclear in a timely fashion and a slow-down in 
investment in renewable power, will result in more 
gas for longer and – in the absence of CCS – higher 
carbon emissions. Thus, a gas-by-design approach 
is required, that explores the consequences of this 
scenario.
As domestic offshore gas production continues 
to decline, an ever-increasing rate of import 
dependence may be anticipated (the National 
Grid’s ‘Gone Green’ scenario forecasts gas demand 
as 54 bcma with 78.5 per cent import dependence 
by 2035). The Government now justifies its support 
for onshore development of shale gas in energy 
security terms. While there are potential benefits 
in terms of import substitution and balance 
of payments from shale gas development, it is 
still very early days and the rate of progress is 
very slow. It is unlikely that domestic shale gas 
production at any scale will start until the early 
2020s. How much shale gas can be produced in the 
UK is impossible to know at present; however, it 
currently seems unlikely to be able to compensate 
for the decline in offshore production. Thus, how 
much gas the UK will have to import in the future 
is dependent on what happens elsewhere in the 
energy system in relation to both supply and 
demand.
4.3 Energy innovation in the UK
by Jim Watson
As this report has already argued, the transition 
to sustainable, low-carbon energy systems will 
require the development and deployment of a 
range of new and existing energy technologies. 
While it is widely accepted that energy efficiency 
and energy demand reduction have a major role to 
play in meeting energy policy goals (DECC, 2012a; 
IEA, 2012), much of the existing research on energy 
innovation focuses on supply. This partly reflects 
the greater level of public support for innovation in 
energy supply technologies (Grubler et al., 2012).
In common with innovation in general, innovation 
in energy technologies is a complex process that 
should be analysed from a systems perspective. 
Innovation is not only concerned with the 
development of new technologies through 
research, development and demonstration 
(R,D&D), it also concerns the deployment of these 
technologies in markets. Innovation is not a linear 
process (Rothwell, 1994), and includes frequent 
feedback loops between the stages of innovation 
and ‘learning by doing’. Onshore wind and solar 
PV provide clear examples where learning through 
deployment has delivered substantial cost 
reductions. However, recent UKERC research also 
suggests that such cost reductions should not be 
taken for granted, and that costs do not always fall 
as expected (see section 4.6 and Gross et al., 2013).
Innovation systems have traditionally focussed at a 
national or regional level, but there is an increasing 
emphasis in innovation research on systems that 
focus on particular groups of technologies (e.g. 
low-carbon technologies). Furthermore, these 
systems are increasingly global which poses 
particular challenges for national innovation 
policies. Innovation within these systems is not 
only a technological process, it is also associated 
with institutional and social changes. For example, 
smarter electricity networks could create new 
opportunities for electricity markets to operate 
in different ways, and change the relationship 
between consumers and energy suppliers.
Public policy support for energy innovation
Government policies have a particularly important 
influence over the direction of innovation. Such 
policies are critical if energy innovation is to be 
steered in a more sustainable direction. They 
are often driven by two aims: to accelerate the 
deployment of cleaner energy technologies 
and to support a domestic industry to develop 
and manufacture, install and maintain these 
technologies. 
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The scale and intensity of government support for 
innovation world-wide has grown in recent years. 
Total public spending on energy R,D&D by OECD 
countries has increased since the 1990s (see Figure 
4.2). Spending by large emerging economies has 
also been significant, including a particularly sharp 
increase in spending by the Chinese government 
since the early 2000s (Kempener et al. 2010). As 
the figure shows, these trends in spending have 
broadly followed movements in global oil prices.
Compared to the spending levels in 1974, spending 
in 2012 was over 50 per cent higher in real terms. 
During the last few years, spending has also 
been boosted by government stimulus packages 
in response to the global financial crisis of 2008. 
This has had a particular impact in the United 
States (IEA, 2013a), but it has also led to spending 
increases in other countries such as China and 
South Korea. The balance of spending has also 
shifted. Spending on renewable energy has 
dramatically increased by more than 10 times and 
energy efficiency spending has increased five-fold. 
At the same time, spending on nuclear power, 
which used to dominate public R,D&D budgets in 
many countries, has declined by 45 per cent as the 
popularity of this technology waned. 
Comprehensive data on private sector energy 
R,D&D spending is not available. Overall, private 
sector spending tends to track government 
spending because some of the same drivers 
apply. Figures from the OECD show that private 
sector R&D in OECD countries has historically 
been dominated by spending on nuclear power 
and oil and gas technologies (Doornbosch and 
Upton, 2006). More recent data from the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre based on 
company reporting confirms a continued focus 
on fossil fuels, albeit with increasing spending on 
lower carbon technologies (Skea et al., 2013). 
Of course, R,D&D spending is only a partial 
indicator of innovation. Other indicators include 
those that seek to track innovation outputs (such 
as patent applications) and outcomes (such as 
technology deployment rates). There has been a 
rapid rise in patent applications since the early 
1990s, particularly for non-fossil energy generation 
technologies and technologies for energy efficiency 
(OECD, 2013). In general, trends in patenting often 
track trends in investment and deployment 
(Lee et al., 2009). Similarly, investment in some 
energy technologies – particularly renewables – has 
risen steeply since the mid-2000s (BNEF, 2014). 
UKERC Research Report
UK Energy in a Global Context
Figure 4.2. Total government energy R,D&D spending by IEA member countries (1974-2012)
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There was some levelling off immediately after 
the 2008 financial crisis, and a significant drop in 
2012 and 2013 due to falls in the cost of solar PV 
technology and changes in policy frameworks for 
renewable energy. Alongside this, it is important 
to remember that global demand for fossil fuels 
has also continued to rise rapidly. Investment in 
these traditional energy sources has remained high 
(e.g. IEA, 2013b), including significant innovation 
in areas like shale gas extraction and deep water 
drilling.
Implications for UK innovation policies
Given that many countries are resource-
constrained, a situation that has been exacerbated 
by the financial crisis of 2008, public funding 
for R&D, technology demonstration and 
market creation is subject to prioritisation and 
specialisation. Few countries can afford to support 
the full range of technologies and the associated 
organisational, institutional changes to the same 
degree. The UK is no exception. Furthermore, 
support for innovation in one country (e.g. 
through the feed-in tariff policy in Germany) can 
benefit firms in another country (e.g. solar PV 
manufacturers in China).
The UK government’s approach to low-carbon 
innovation policy has moved in a positive direction 
over the last 10 years. As the National Audit Office 
(NAO) showed recently (National Audit Office, 
2013), the government has significantly increased 
funding for R,D&D since the early 2000s. The vast 
majority of this funding has been directed to low-
carbon technologies. Furthermore, the balance 
of spending between supply- and demand-side 
innovations has improved.
Demonstration is a particularly risky stage of 
the innovation process because it requires an 
increasing amount of investment to be made 
by a technology developer at a time when the 
risks of failure remain high. Government policy 
has an important role to play in supporting 
technologies across this ‘valley of death’ between 
R&D and commercial deployment. The UK’s CCS 
commercialisation programme and the Ofgem 
Low Carbon Networks Fund (LCNF) are two good 
examples of UK government funding for this stage 
of the innovation process. It is not clear in either 
case whether this funding will help deliver all of 
the desired outcomes.
However, the UK’s innovation policies also have 
some weaknesses. Four issues are particularly 
important. First, although public funding for 
R,D&D has increased from the very low levels 
seen in the 1990s, this has been inconsistent. 
There has been a dramatic decline since funding 
peaked in 2010 – with a one-third reduction in total 
public spend between 2010-11 and 2011-12 alone. 
It is not possible to determine how much larger 
public R,D&D budgets should be because such 
spending does not guarantee desired outcomes 
such as industrial development and technology 
deployment. However, the IEA has suggested an 
increase to 3-6 times current levels is required 
(Skea et al., 2013).
Second, there has been a lack of systematic 
evaluation of past R,D&D programmes, and the 
inclusion of explicit learning within the design 
of new or revised programmes. Within these 
evaluations, there is a need to allow for failures as 
well as successes, and to learn lessons from both. 
In some cases, such learning has been undertaken. 
For example, both DECC and the NAO have 
reflected on some of the problems encountered in 
attempts to fund full-scale CCS demonstrations 
(National Audit Office 2012). While progress 
with the demonstration of CCS technologies has 
been slow and frustrating (Watson et al., 2012) 
lessons learned have then been incorporated 
into the design of the current phase of the CCS 
commercialisation programme.
Third, co-ordination across public sector bodies 
and agencies may not be effective enough. There 
have been some recent improvements led by 
the Low Carbon Innovation Co-ordinating Group 
(LCICG, 2014). This Group has been successful to 
some extent in improving co-ordination and taking 
a ‘high level’ strategic view of priorities. However, 
co-ordination could be more effective at the level 
of individual technology areas. For example, a 
number of initiatives are supporting smarter 
electricity and heat networks including the Energy 
Fuel cell.
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Technologies Institute smart systems and heat 
programme, the LCNF and a proposed new Energy 
Systems Catapult (funded by the government’s 
Technology Strategy Board). There is significant 
scope for a greater level of information sharing, 
and joint learning across these initiatives.
Fourth, the understanding of innovation in 
energy systems – and policies to steer innovation 
processes – need to pay more attention to the 
history and momentum of these systems. It has 
been argued that because of this momentum, 
energy systems in the UK and other industrialised 
countries are ‘locked-in’ to the use of fossil fuels, 
and hence high carbon emissions (Unruh, 2000; 
Unruh, 2002). This means that if markets are left to 
themselves, energy systems tend to change slowly. 
Transitions such as the historical shifts in the UK 
from wood fuel to coal have taken many decades 
(e.g. Pearson & Fouquet, 2006). The systemic 
innovation required to shift energy systems in 
a more low-carbon and sustainable direction is 
likely to include political challenges to existing, 
unsustainable technologies and their associated 
actors and interests. 
4.4 UK public attitudes and values related 
to energy system transitions
by Nick Pidgeon, Christina Demski, 
Catherine Butler, Karen Parkhill
and Alexa Spence
Despite the very obvious human, social and 
cultural drivers of both climate change and global 
energy security, proposed solutions to such issues 
are largely dominated by the physical sciences, 
technology, and economics. Scenarios of future 
energy system change, whether within the UK 
and EU or other regions of the globe, often embed 
assumptions that new technologies fostered 
through appropriate market instruments or 
financial incentives will be sufficient to ensure 
transition to a low-carbon and resilient energy 
system. Such approaches typically overlook the 
important role that people and communities 
will play in transforming future energy systems 
(Spence & Pidgeon, 2009).
The diversity of public attitudes on energy
On the supply side of this equation, it is known 
that some people hold very strong objections to 
particular technologies such as nuclear power 
(Butler et al., 2013a). Accordingly, where nuclear 
also plays an important role in low-carbon policy 
scenarios (for the UK see, for example, DECC, 2011), 
gaining public trust and acceptability must be 
factored into decision-making.
New proposals such as for biofuels, unconventional 
gas, or innovative bulk energy storage are likely to 
raise similar questions in the public mind. Even 
when a technology, such as onshore wind, has very 
favourable general evaluations in national surveys, 
this does not preclude it encountering substantial 
opposition at a local level. Local contestation 
can arise because of competing notions over 
the ‘appropriate’ use of local spaces, as well as 
concerns over the fairness of processes for public 
consultation and engagement (Woods, 2003; van 
der Horst, 2007; Pidgeon & Demski, 2012).
People and communities are equally important 
for proposed demand-side changes, since 
many existing scenarios envisage considerable 
behavioural change, alongside the social 
acceptability of interventions. Modelling 
undertaken for both the UK (UKERC, 2009) and 
the USA (Dietz et al., 2009) suggests that very 
significant energy savings can be achieved in 
developed nations through altered lifestyles. 
However, this would require changes such as 
substantial uptake by existing home-owners of 
modern insulation systems, and new social norms 
promoting more efficient home appliances and 
vehicles, as well as different ways of using them. 
Anticipating public responses to such changes 
creates an additional layer of uncertainty and 
indeterminacy, over and above the technological 
and economic uncertainties more typically 
considered in national and global energy scenarios 
(Butler et al., 2014).
In addition, energy systems involve a complex 
assemblage of resources and supply technologies, 
demand technologies and associated behaviours, 
energy infrastructure, ‘softer’ system elements 
such as regulation and policies, and the various 
actors and institutions involved. Public views about 
the future will be dependent upon the way such 
changes occur as a whole, while people might also 
judge the acceptability of individual elements of 
the system differently when considering options in 
the light of different governance arrangements or 
the different overarching policy frames of climate 
change targets and long-term sustainability, energy 
affordability, and energy security (Corner et al., 
2011).
The UKERC Public Values and Attitudes project 
sought to explore public perspectives in the 
UK; looking at the interconnected set of system 
changes as a whole, synthesising findings across 
innovative deliberative (Butler et al., 2013b) and 
survey-based approaches (Demski et al., 2013). 
Many of the results give particular pause for 
thought.
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The public participants overwhelmingly and 
enthusiastically endorsed a need for radical change 
to the energy system in the future – an important 
conclusion given the often repeated stereotype of 
a public that is intractably opposed to any form 
of change. Interestingly, some technologies which 
are central to decarbonisation scenarios for the 
UK and other nations evoked quite ambivalent 
preferences, as when carbon capture technologies 
were viewed by participants as a ‘non-transition’ 
– that is a change that simply perpetuated an 
already undesirable dependence upon fossil fuels 
and existing energy system trajectories.
Research in other countries has begun to 
explore similar issues using portfolios of energy 
technologies (see de Best Waldhober et al., 2009; 
Fleishman et al., 2010; Hobman et al., 2012; 
Scheer et al., 2013) or locally-based scenarios 
(Trutnevyte et al., 2011). A key innovation in 
the Public Attitudes and Values project was the 
attempt to go beyond such studies by building an 
understanding of the deeper values and concerns 
underlying people’s preferences (see Parkhill et al., 
2013). While specific preferences (i.e. for individual 
elements of system change) might not yet be fully 
formed, or be highly conditional on other elements 
of change being realised, a more meaningful 
insight into public perspectives was deemed to 
come from examining what values and worldviews 
people bring with them to the engagement process, 
because it is these that they draw on to understand 
new information and concepts as well as to 
construct responses. 
The importance of values
The values emerging from this research were 
underpinned by two fundamental ideas: the view 
(a) that society should in the long term be moving 
away from the exploitation of finite (typically fossil 
fuel) resources in favour of renewable technologies 
coupled with (b) greater efficiencies and a 
reduction in energy use as a whole.
Avoiding waste, the protection of nature and the 
environment, providing security and reliability, 
equity of impacts, a degree of autonomy for 
individuals and communities, and technological 
improvement embedded within a long-term view 
of system change were also values that were 
desired and ones that people felt would help to 
meet the two more fundamental ideas outlined 
above.
Values are being used here to refer to guiding 
principles in life which, as relatively durable 
entities, are ‘measures not of individual preference 
but an index of support for a morally right or just 
society’ (Chan et al., 2012). As such values cannot 
always be simply traded-off with each other, 
but may require a careful negotiation of moral 
principles. To clarify how such values operate, solar 
power may be taken as an example. 
The public view solar power in a highly favourable 
light in many countries in part because it is a 
renewable energy. However, it may be imagined 
that a solar energy installation supplying the 
Three energy technologies – nuclear power, onshore wind, fracking – which have been subject to public controversy.
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UK but residing in North Africa is revealed as 
causing local environmental contamination and 
land-use territorial disputes. This version of solar 
deployment would not fit the general positive 
public preference for solar energy as in this 
instance it would no longer be seen as ‘fair’, ‘just’ 
or ‘clean’. As such, public importance is attached 
to meeting renewable, clean, just and affordable 
values in future energy systems, and not just to 
solar energy technology itself.
A global dimension to attitudes and values
Although the main focus of UKERC’s research 
has been people’s views on the energy system of 
the UK, participants in the qualitative workshops 
frequently situated UK changes in terms of 
their global dimensions (Butler et al., 2013b). 
Fundamentally, the participants recognised not 
only the importance of linkages within the UK’s 
energy system but also, as their discussions 
around UK ‘energy security’ illustrated, how we 
are all now part of a global energy system. In this 
regard, they reflected on how the impacts of our 
national, group and individual choices are often 
felt at global spatial scales and across different 
times. In addition to this, while there was concern 
about climate change and the polluting nature of 
many industries, there was also an awareness that 
emissions were still being created but had simply 
been relocated to other countries. This logic led 
participants to conclude that in the shifting of 
manufacturing from the UK to other countries the 
principal issues of pollution and climate change 
were not being adequately addressed, while at the 
same time this meant that much needed jobs for 
the UK were being reduced.
Engaging with values in policy
UKERC research has also demonstrated how a 
varied cross-section of UK publics are perfectly 
capable of deliberating complex issues of energy 
policy and technology with which they have 
little day-to-day familiarity given the right tools, 
information and opportunity. Approaching energy 
system change though exploring values rather 
than simple expressed ‘preferences’ adds to our 
understanding of the core reasons for public 
acceptance or rejection of different energy system 
aspects. Public perspectives, in the UK but also in 
other nations and regions of the globe, are never 
solely about technology, but are ultimately about 
what the technology symbolises and represents, 
as well as people’s views on the actors, institutions 
and processes embedded in system change.
A clear policy conclusion of the research, then, 
is that these social dimensions must always 
be considered alongside other more technical 
elements of system change. When engineers, 
businesses or policy makers judge the potential 
for acceptability of any particular proposed future 
energy system change it would make good sense 
to think first about the derived value set and 
whether any change is compatible (or alternatively 
incompatible) with it, rather than to focus simply 
upon the observable ‘risks’ and ‘benefits’ of the 
technology per se. While doing so would not 
guarantee the absence of contestation and debate, 
engaging with the value set may enable both 
the UK and the wider global society to develop 
smoother transitions to alternative energy futures.  
4.5 Future energy markets and networks 
in the UK and European Union
by Catherine Mitchell
The European Union (EU) is committed to creating 
broad, integrated regional markets for electricity 
(and at some time in the future for natural gas) 
by implementing what is referred to as the EU 
target model of market coupling. In effect, market 
coupling requires that regional, and no longer 
exclusively national, supply and demand for 
electricity (and gas) will establish energy market 
clearing prices. This pan-European vision of market 
trading builds upon current European energy-
only  electricity or gas markets, which consist of 
power exchange-based short-term energy markets, 
longer-term bilateral trades between individual 
buyers and sellers, and real-time balancing 
services administered by the system operator. 
By design, the EU target market model optimises 
cross-border flows to reflect energy-only price 
differentials between the coupled markets (Baker 
and Gottstein, 2013). Therefore the rules and 
incentives of future energy markets have to both 
deliver what is needed in a Member State, but also 
fit with the requirements of European laws. 
As noted earlier, current energy policy objectives 
revolve around decarbonisation, security and 
affordability. These objectives, particularly the first, 
have led to technological change and new, more 
integrated ways of thinking about energy system 
operation.
The decarbonisation arc is initiating a shift from 
a low capital cost, high fuel cost energy system 
to a high capital and low / zero fuel cost energy 
system. The energy system is therefore broadly 
moving from a centralised energy system of a few 
supply technologies and one-way networks to 
one which is made up of multiple different types 
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of supply, demand and operational technologies 
which together enable the efficient and integrated 
running of the system. Cost reductions in 
the former type of system mainly come from 
economies of scale. Cost reduction in the latter 
energy systems will also derive increasingly from 
the efficient integration, operation and use of 
energy.  
At the same time, policies on decarbonisation 
(e.g. smart grid development, storage, 
interconnection and so on) have become central to 
shaping market conditions, for limiting/increasing 
uncertainty and for encouraging/discouraging 
investment. As noted in section 4.3, policies to 
reduce emissions and/or energy demand have 
major implications for current energy incumbents, 
and their current businesses, as well as for 
investors. These policy decisions are made outside 
what is currently seen as the market framework 
yet these are central to market outcomes.
While it is clear that low-carbon technologies are 
required if carbon emissions are to be reduced, 
increasing R,D&D and deployment support 
related to clean energy – supply, demand and 
management technologies, across global supply 
chains, is making the relative prices of different 
low-carbon solutions highly volatile over the short 
and medium term. The fall in solar electricity 
prices due to Chinese investment is a graphic 
example of this (REN21, 2013). As a result, energy 
policy delivery, and policy success or otherwise, has 
become a major driver of market and technological 
uncertainty, and this is feeding into investment 
concerns, and then into energy security concerns.
With respect to electricity, much has been 
written about the theoretical concerns of adding 
renewable electricity to the energy system. Most 
of that literature has been overly negative and/
or conservative about the consequences, meaning 
that the costs to the system of greater levels of 
variable renewable power have been overestimated 
(e.g. Milligan & Kirby, 2010; Borggrefe & Neuhoff, 
2011; IEA, 2011; SSRENIPCC, 2011).  However, 
evidence from electricity systems where there is 
a high proportion of variable renewable electricity 
has shown that there are three serious market or 
operational challenges which need to be addressed.
Firstly, increasing proportions of high capital 
cost and low (nuclear power) or zero (variable 
renewable electricity) fuel cost technologies 
are able to bid in low or zero marginal costs to 
conventional electricity markets. This effectively 
shifts the electricity supply curve to the right, 
bringing down both average and peak prices 
(Bauknecht et al., 2013; Cochran et al., 2013).
An increasing share of nuclear power and 
renewable electricity in the absence of increased 
demand means that conventional generators will 
be displaced more often by low or zero marginal 
cost electricity sources and sell electricity at lower 
prices when they are selected – and they therefore 
will run at lower and less predictable capacity 
factors and therefore earn less revenue.
Secondly, as more countries have policies and 
targets for low-carbon or renewable electricity, 
the investment risks for fossil generation are 
increasing. Investors in a fossil power plant have 
to be confident that they can sell their power plant 
output for enough years at a sufficient price to 
make their investment worthwhile. As more and 
more low-carbon or variable renewable power 
comes on the system, so there is less and less 
market demand to be met by fossil generation 
and the average system marginal cost may fall. 
Just as individual fossil generators are questioning 
their economics in electricity systems with high 
proportions of variable power, so the availability 
of flexible capacity and suitable ancillary 
services becomes even more important in order 
to complement the increasingly inflexible and 
uncertain output of nuclear and renewables. 
Thirdly, a further challenge to conventional 
electricity systems is that related to balancing. 
Conventional electricity systems balance uncertain 
demand (i.e. customers around the system turning 
their lights, appliances and load requirements 
on and off with more or less unpredictability) 
with certain supply to match it (i.e. supply 
from firm, dispatchable coal and gas plants). 
As greater proportions of variable, or relatively 
inflexible, power are introduced into the electricity 
system, the system operator and/or balancer 
has to balance the uncertain demand with more 
uncertain supply. This is a fundamental change 
in the operation of the electricity system, and has 
major knock-on effects for the economics of the 
wider energy system (Riesz et al., 2013). Making 
the demand side more flexible by a greater use of 
storage and demand side response mechanisms in 
markets, including load shifting via smart grids, is 
becoming of increasing importance and value.
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The rules and incentives of electricity markets and 
networks, and their regulation have a fundamental 
impact on the way electricity systems work, and 
on their outputs such as carbon dioxide. Future 
markets will have to alter rules and incentives 
so that they overcome the challenges outlined 
above, responding to technological and market 
uncertainty, encouraging investment, and 
incentivising capabilities markets (one dimension 
of which is capacity) to ensure appropriate 
flexibility to back up variable power and utilise 
the demand side effectively (Borggrefe & Neuhoff, 
2011; IEA, 2011; Hogan, 2012; Bauknecht et al., 2013; 
Cochran et al., 2013; Hurley et al., 2013; Keay-Bright, 
2013; Riesz et al., 2013).
At its most simplistic the regulation of such 
markets will comprise electricity rules and 
incentives which support system-orientated 
solutions for renewable electricity rather than 
solutions for single plants; and that incentivise 
and reward storage, the demand side, smart grids, 
and technical flexibility in general via capability 
markets at a system-wide level (Gottstein 2011; 
Gottstein & Skillings, 2012; Hogan, 2012; 
Baker & Gottstein, 2013; Keay-Bright, 2013). Such 
regulation must encourage and help to create 
large, liquid markets with the ability to aggregate 
services across large balancing areas, including 
through transmission and storage investments, 
interconnection and inclusion of the demand 
side, which can mitigate internal congestion 
and constraints, which otherwise usually lead 
to wasted renewable electricity or enforced 
curtailment of demand.
The European target market model, mentioned 
earlier in this section, aims to create an efficient 
European energy system where the optimal 
balance of maximising ‘local’ energy as well as 
system wide operational attributes is reached. It 
is reasonably clear what the goals of individual 
Member States should be for their market rules 
and incentives. Implementing the rules and 
incentives which deliver the type of markets will 
be more or less difficult for the different Member 
States depending on their geography and natural 
resources; the state of development of their energy 
systems; and their institutional and political 
arrangements (Lockwood et al., 2013). Many 
European countries have already significantly 
moved towards the target market model – for 
example, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Austria, 
Sweden, Norway and Portugal. There are a great 
many lessons, and examples of best practice, 
that can be learnt from these European countries 
and elsewhere in the world (for example, US and 
Australian regional markets).
Increasingly individual Member States are being 
affected by other Member States policies. For 
example, large German utilities no longer wish to 
invest in nuclear power because of the German 
decision to shut down all nuclear power plants. 
These types of cross-Member State impacts can 
only increase further and all countries, including 
the UK, will find themselves increasingly driven 
towards market rules and incentives which fit with 
wider European policies.
4.6 Energy prices and bills
by Rob Gross and Paul Ekins
The cost of energy, to businesses and households, 
is a major source of public debate in the UK. 
This section discusses some of the factors that 
feed into these costs, with an emphasis on their 
international drivers and implications. Many of 
the factors that influence the costs of energy for 
UK consumers are at least partly international 
in nature. Fossil fuel markets are global or 
regional, and the costs of supply and demand 
side technologies and measures are subject to 
international drivers. Furthermore, as noted in 
section 4.5, many of the utilities that dominate UK 
electricity and gas markets are international – and 
their strategies are not solely determined by the 
dynamics of the UK energy market. The section 
also returns to the theme of innovation (following 
on from section 4.3) and discusses one of the most 
important future drivers of energy bills: the costs 
of low-carbon electricity generation technologies.
The affordability of UK energy
The present and potential future cost of 
decarbonising UK energy has been the subject 
of much public debate and some confusion. The 
confusion, at least, has been unnecessary because 
the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) has set 
out very clearly (CCC, 2012) the relative impact of 
different factors that have contributed to recent 
electricity and gas bill increases, and how their 
recommendations for future decarbonisation are 
likely to affect bills to 2020. DECC has conducted 
a similar analysis, which reaches broadly similar 
conclusions (DECC, 2013b).
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The CCC analysis is illustrated in Figure 4.3, which 
breaks down the average dual-fuel bill (for the 
86 per cent of UK households who are connected 
to both the electricity and gas networks) into the 
different components of which it is comprised. 
This shows that in 2011 over 60 per cent of such 
bills derived from wholesale energy and supplier 
costs, over 20 per cent came from transmission, 
distribution and metering, and just 4.5 per cent 
(£45) came from investments in energy efficiency, 
which may be presumed to have reduced bills 
below what they would otherwise have been, 
and 3.5 per cent (£35) came from support for 
low-carbon energy supply, mainly renewables. 
A significant proportion of current energy costs 
are therefore not solely within the control of UK 
policy makers or UK-based energy companies. 
As noted above, fossil fuel prices are partly 
determined by international markets. The costs 
of current and new energy technologies depend 
partly on international factors such as the extent 
of deployment in other markets, innovation by 
international firms and currency exchange rates.
The CCC further estimates that by 2020 support for 
low-carbon supply (in this case renewables, CCS 
and nuclear) will have added a further £100 per 
household per year, as shown in Figure 4.3, with 
wholesale and supplier costs having increased 
by £130 and transmission and distribution costs 
(including costs associated with upgrading the 
electricity grid and providing back-up generation 
to support more intermittent generation) 
having added a further £55, while it is estimated 
that energy efficiency investments over this 
period will reduce average bills by £145 below 
what they would otherwise have been. Clearly 
these projections are subject to a number of 
uncertainties – particularly the future trajectory 
of electricity generation costs (see later in this 
section), the price of fossil fuels (particularly 
natural gas – see section 4.2) and the extent of 
progress with energy efficiency (see section 4.1). 
But, given the warnings of climate science, £135 
per household per year (the 2011 plus the 2020 
costs) does not seem an excessive amount for a 
relatively rich country like the UK to pay to make 
a fair contribution to preventing dangerous man-
made climate change.
The CCC (2012) report provides a similar 
analysis for industrial energy costs as it does for 
households, with broadly similar results. However, 
it acknowledges that, while these average costs 
may be affordable for most households and 
businesses, without greatly affecting their welfare 
or competitiveness, this may not be true for 
households vulnerable to fuel poverty or energy-
Figure 4.3. Change in Average Residential Energy Bill – Gas and Electricity
(2011 and projected in 2020)
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intensive sectors. Households in this category and 
businesses in these sectors may therefore need 
special arrangements to ensure that the former 
can get access to the energy they need to keep 
warm, and the latter can continue to compete 
internationally, at least until such time as it is clear 
that energy-intensive sectors outside the European 
Union (EU) are facing similar carbon emission 
reduction costs to those prevailing in the EU.
Case study: forecasting the costs of low-carbon 
power generation
Many analyses of the costs of decarbonisation, 
including analysis conducted by the CCC, present 
an expectation that the costs of low-carbon 
technologies will reduce through time. Yet since 
the mid-2000s the price of building power stations 
in the UK has gone up – for conventional gas power 
stations and some (though not all) renewables. 
Estimates of the expected costs of building new 
nuclear and carbon capture and storage plants 
also increased (Gross et al., 2013). Many of these 
increases in costs and prices were not anticipated 
and stand in sharp contrast to a widely shared 
view that costs tend to fall over time, particularly 
for emerging technologies.
There is a rich international literature on the 
sources of cost reduction in all technologies, 
and how best to estimate future cost-trends. 
The principal approaches can be characterised 
as ‘engineering assessment’, and ‘learning’ or 
‘experience’ curves (e.g. Klaassen et al., 2005; 
Neij, 2008). Engineering-based approaches offer 
advantages for early stage technologies with very 
limited market exposure, since the absence of 
historical cost and deployment data militates 
against the use of experience curves. The 
potential to consider sources of cost reduction 
‘parametrically’ – to break down the costs of a 
technology into a set of component parameters – 
also allows for sensitivity to key cost changes to 
be assessed. Engineering assessments may also 
help to identify discontinuities or innovations that 
learning curves cannot anticipate.
Learning curves chart the relationship between 
market growth and cost reduction, an empirical 
phenomenon that has been identified for 
technologies in numerous sectors of the economy. 
The literature both applies learning curves to 
particular technologies and discusses their 
usefulness and limitations. Some complexities 
associated with learning curves include: 
whether learning rates vary through time and 
as technologies mature; the presence of ‘cost 
floors’; the difficulties associated with projecting 
deployment; divergent costs and prices; system 
boundary issues; and alternative sources of 
learning (such as learning by researching). 
A recent UKERC report on electricity generation 
costs conducted detailed case studies of several 
technologies: nuclear power, gas-fired combined-
cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), carbon capture and 
storage, onshore and offshore wind and solar PV 
(Gross et al., 2013). It concluded that the costs 
of electricity generation can indeed fall through 
time and as deployment rises. However, market 
growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for learning and cost reduction. There are many 
dimensions involved in both projecting future 
costs and creating the conditions for costs to fall. 
The literature highlights the learning potential of 
spill-overs from research, indicating that continued 
attention to R,D&D (see section 4.3) is an essential 
accompaniment to market enablement.
Fuel and commodity prices, which are partly driven 
by global markets, can also have large impacts 
on costs: these are largely unanticipated by most 
cost forecasters. Escalations in the prices of both 
fuels and essential raw materials overwhelmed 
downward cost trends previously seen in several 
technologies and anticipated in others. In addition, 
cost reductions from learning can be overwhelmed 
in the short term by supply chain bottlenecks, 
build delays and ‘teething troubles’ as new 
technologies are going through their early stages 
of development. There are historical precedents 
for technologies deployed in the power sector 
to demonstrate cost increases before supply 
chains and learning from experience are firmly 
established. 
Because of these and other factors, cost reduction 
projections are difficult and challenging. Analysts 
and policy makers should not be surprised 
if forecasts turn out to be wrong. However, 
projections do need to make uncertainties 
and assumptions clear. In particular there is a 
need to make a distinction between different 
types of uncertainty, and recognise that some 
categories of uncertainties cannot be resolved. 
Some uncertainties are exogenous, inherently 
unpredictable and may exhibit high volatility. 
Others are endogenous, ‘known’ and therefore lend 
themselves more readily to future projection. 
Despite uncertainties, recent studies of energy 
technology costs show improved ‘appraisal 
realism’. The scope of cost estimates (for example 
what is and what is not included) and the 
assumptions regarding other key variables (such 
as the discount rate) tend to be well documented 
in recent analyses undertaken for the government 
and bodies such as the CCC. 
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4.7 Ecosystem impacts of energy 
technologies: the global impacts of UK 
energy choices
by Rob Holland
The last few decades have seen a growing 
recognition of the contribution that the natural 
world makes to human wellbeing through 
the provision of what are termed ecosystem 
services. Commonly grouped into four categories 
(provisioning, regulating, supporting and cultural) 
ecosystem services flow from the world’s natural 
capital, that comprises the living and non-living 
components of nature. These ecosystem services 
have significant value, both in terms of their 
monetary worth and through benefits to the 
physical, mental, spiritual and emotional wellbeing 
of individuals and to society.
Major studies such as the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (2005) and the UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment (UK NEA, 2011) have highlighted the 
pressures that many ecosystem services are under. 
With the setting up of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES), an institution comparable to the IPCC, 
the international community will increasingly be 
required to take action to both address greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions and the degradation and loss 
of biodiversity and ecosystem services. It is within 
this context that the implications of differing 
energy technologies and future strategies for 
ecosystem services need to be examined.
The unifying theme that emerges from such an 
examination is the need to consider both the 
national and international implications of energy 
policy on the provision of ecosystem services. 
Analysis using consumption-based techniques 
and life cycle assessment has demonstrated that 
failure to account for impacts beyond national 
borders may lead to a significant underestimate 
of the true implications of UK choices of energy 
technologies for ecosystem services globally 
(Barrett et al., 2013; CCC, 2013; Scott et al., 2013). 
These assessments, together with a growing 
literature that has emerged in recent years, 
suggest that developing countries may be most 
significantly affected by demand pressures from 
overseas, yet it is within these developing countries 
that the greatest reliance on ecosystem services 
may exist.
The relationship between energy technologies 
and ecosystem services has been a major focus of 
work for UKERC (see review in Hinton and Holland, 
2014). To explore the global implications of energy 
technology four contrasting energy systems 
(nuclear, gas, wind and biomass to CHP) were 
examined using an ecosystem services assessment 
method based on systematic reviews and expert 
knowledge (see Papathanasopoulou et al., in prep). 
These technologies were chosen as they feature 
strongly in many scenarios of UK energy futures, 
and represent a range of carbon emission and 
other environmental intensities that encompass 
both the marine and terrestrial environments.
Oilseed rape is widely grown for biofuel production, which is traded internationally.
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The analysis provided a number of insights for 
the UK energy sector. In particular, while much 
of the published research focuses on the fuel 
cycle or operational stages, which tend to take 
place in the UK, such information as exists on 
upstream activities (associated with extraction and 
processing of raw materials for construction of 
infrastructure) suggests that these have significant 
impacts on ecosystem services, with much of the 
activity and associated impacts being outside the 
UK. 
Linking such findings to future energy scenarios 
provides a mechanism to explore the implications 
of energy policies for the provision of ecosystem 
services, and ultimately the impacts that such 
choices will have on individuals and society, both 
in the UK and more widely. Across the technologies 
examined, the stage in the life cycle, and the 
location where this activity is occurring, define the 
impact of each technology and so represent key 
factors to be incorporated in the decision making 
process. The increasing availability of global 
geographic data, and models describing the flows 
of goods and materials around the world, present 
real opportunities to incorporate such knowledge 
in the decision making process, so contributing to 
the sustainability of energy production.
As the perceived value of ecosystem services 
differs among individuals and communities, 
understanding the impact of different energy 
strategies represents a major challenge, and 
one that has profound implications for human 
wellbeing and for the decision making process. 
Exploration of future energy scenarios was based 
on broad-brush global patterns of impacts, with 
an outstanding challenge being to refine our 
understanding down to sub-national scales. For 
example, research that traced one supply chain, 
that of Brazilian ethanol supplied to the UK, 
demonstrated the importance of including the 
social context for understanding implications of 
technologies.
Social life-cycle assessment revealed significant 
benefits within the producer region in Brazil 
and negative implications for consumers in the 
UK, challenging many common assumptions 
associated with this technology.  Such work 
demonstrates that combining community 
knowledge with coarser-scale understanding of 
the potential impacts of energy technologies on 
ecosystem services can provide a powerful tool to 
guide policy, and should increasingly be used in the 
energy debate. 
Energy technologies are incredibly diverse, and 
this diversity interacts with regional variations in 
climatic, social, political and economic conditions 
to affect the sustainability issues experienced. 
Although implications for climate remain a 
key driver shaping global energy policy, work 
highlighted here demonstrates the importance of 
considering the full range of ecosystem service 
consequences when developing future energy 
strategies. Given the importance of these services 
for human well-being, failure to do so may lead to 
a significant underestimate of the true implications 
of choices of energy technologies.
As impacts may often be displaced overseas, with 
the potential to affect individuals and communities 
with high reliance on ecosystem services, there 
is a compelling case to assess impacts of energy 
production in a way that considers the global 
context. The techniques that such work highlights 
are amongst a suite of emerging tools that enable 
the global costs and benefits associated with 
different energy pathways to be examined and 
more informed policy guidance that can consider 
these issues to be produced, in turn allowing 
improved strategies to meet future energy 
requirements to be designed, which reduce overall 
social and environmental costs.  
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Conclusions and Policy Responses
by Paul Ekins and Jim Watson
UK energy policy has been extraordinarily 
innovative over the past two decades, as the 
imperatives associated with the energy trilemma 
have come to be perceived as increasingly pressing, 
and the solutions increasingly difficult to negotiate. 
This brief concluding section can do no more than 
hint as to how government might seek to address 
the various challenges and issues discussed above, 
with the policy directions suggested needing much 
further development. In what follows the three 
elements of the trilemma are discussed in turn. 
The order of their discussion does not represent 
their priority, because one of the features of the 
trilemma is that, as will hopefully emerge from 
the discussion, either all three elements will be 
successfully addressed, or none of them will be.
Decarbonisation
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) has, on a 
number of occasions, called for a ‘step change’ in 
policy ambition on carbon emission reduction
(e.g. CCC, 2009; CCC, 2012) if its carbon budgets, 
and the overall statutory 2050 carbon emission 
target, are to be met. While UK carbon emissions, 
at least if those emissions arising from the 
products the UK imports are ignored, have 
certainly fallen substantially since 1990, the major 
causes have been the substitution of gas for coal 
for power generation in the 1990s, the recession 
following the financial crisis in 2008-09 and, in 
some cases such as household energy efficiency, 
the impact of government policies. However, the 
CCC’s call for a step change in policy ambition is 
still valid.
First, the policies need to ensure that the near-
term targets to which the UK is legally committed, 
namely the second and third carbon budget 
through to 2023, and the 2020 renewables 
target, are actually achieved. The signs here 
are reasonably hopeful, but achievement of the 
renewables target depends crucially on the success 
of the continuing Renewables Obligation (RO), 
the Contracts for Difference (CfD) feed-in tariffs 
that will take over from it in 2017, the Feed-in 
Tariffs (FiTs) for smaller-scale generation, and 
the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI), actually 
delivering the renewables deployment for which 
they were designed. Apart from keeping the level 
of incentive under review, to ensure that it is 
adequate, but not excessive, the government needs 
strenuously to avoid giving conflicting signals as 
to future policy direction, or adopting confusing or 
inconsistent policies. If £100 billion or more private 
investment is required in the UK energy system, 
as is sometimes estimated, then government will 
need “to provide the support and policy certainty 
needed” (HMT, 2013). While significant progress 
has been made in recent years – particularly with 
respect to renewable electricity deployment – there 
is a very long way to go. 
Because the renewables target is expressed as 
a percentage of energy demand, reducing this 
demand through efficiency measures, while 
countering the rebound effect, will reduce the 
quantity of renewables that need to be supplied for 
the target to be met. It will also reduce the need for 
other low-carbon technologies to meet electricity, 
heat and transport demand. Because, as widely 
agreed, increasing energy efficiency is cheaper 
that providing new sources of energy supply, and 
because energy efficiency actually reduces the 
costs of delivering a given level of energy service, 
the greater the contribution to meeting the target 
that comes from energy efficiency, the lower will be 
resulting increase in energy bills.
By reducing the quantity of energy required, 
energy efficiency also contributes to increasing 
energy security, thereby showing itself to be one 
of the few means of positively addressing all three 
components of the trilemma. In this context, the 
government decision at the end of 2013 to slow 
down the rate of installation of household energy 
efficiency measures was perplexing. If it was 
felt politically essential to relieve the pressure 
on energy bills, then it would surely have been 
possible within the overall total of public spending 
to have found an extra £1 billion per year of 
investment in the UK building stock in order to 
reduce its energy demands into the long-term 
future.
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Security
As discussed in section 2 of this report, energy 
security is perhaps the most complex dimension 
of the energy trilemma. That makes policies to 
maintain or strengthen energy security particularly 
challenging. One problem for policy makers – 
or indeed for individuals and communities – is 
that the potential risks to energy security are 
numerous. Some risks are international, and are 
often outside the control of government and other 
actors in the UK. In principle, risks originating from 
within the UK are more amenable to control. But in 
practice, they can be equally hard to predict.
Policy and industry discussions of UK energy 
security tend to focus on two issues: the 
possibility that the UK will not have the necessary 
infrastructure – mainly but not only power stations 
and transmission and distribution networks to 
distribute their electricity – to provide energy to 
consumers when they need it; and the possibility 
that the UK will not be able to import the primary 
energy it needs for power generation, heat and 
transport. While this focus is understandable, it is 
partial.
As discussed in section 4.2, UK gas security is 
critically important for the UK – and is likely to 
remain so for the foreseeable future. Yet there 
is much less attention to the low levels of gas 
storage in the UK than there is on the potential for 
inadequate electricity generation capacity.
Given the unpredictable nature of energy security 
risks, it makes sense to pursue a strategy of energy 
resilience. This means implementing strategies 
that make the energy system robust to a range of 
risks, many of which cannot be precisely known in 
advance.
Three elements of resilience strategies are 
particularly important. First, policies are required 
to ensure investment in electricity and gas 
infrastructures, including power generation 
capacity and gas storage. Second, policies should 
encourage diversity in electricity generation and 
in gas and oil supplies. As discussed in section 4.2, 
the UK’s gas supplies currently include significant 
amounts of diversity – including a range of sources 
and supply routes for gas. Third, there should be a 
strong emphasis on energy efficiency and demand 
reduction (see above) so that any increases in 
prices due to energy security risks will have a lower 
impact on households and businesses. 
All three of these strategies imply a major role for 
government. Investment in sufficient electricity 
generation capacity – including a diverse mix 
of technologies and fuel sources – can only be 
addressed if policies are in place to ensure that 
energy companies can earn the going return from 
investments in new generation plant. Similarly, if 
the UK is to increase the amount of gas storage 
capacity, government will need to provide gas 
companies greater incentives to invest.
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The current turmoil surrounding energy companies 
and markets hardly gives confidence on this score, 
particularly for electricity. This is contributing to 
tighter capacity margins that could be problematic 
if the winters of 2015-16 or 2016-17 are really cold. 
The capacity mechanism in the Energy Act 2013 is 
intended to reassure energy companies that their 
existing or new plants (particularly those that are 
gas-fired) will be economically viable. However, the 
mechanism will not have an impact until later this 
decade – and National Grid has had to step in with 
short-term measures in the meantime.
Current market conditions for gas-fired generation 
are not propitious, with cheaper coal squeezing out 
gas (and increasing carbon emissions) on the one 
hand, and zero marginal cost renewables, when 
available, doing the same on the other. Of course, 
the rapid advances in renewables deployment, and 
their zero fuel costs, should be celebrated. They 
can have a positive impact on energy security 
where they reduce the need for fossil fuels. But 
intermittent renewables such as wind power can 
also lead to new energy security challenges, though 
only when they account for a more significant 
share of the electricity generation mix than they do 
now (see section 4.5).
It is often argued that domestic energy sources 
are likely to be better for energy security than 
those that are imported. While the empirical 
evidence for such claims is thin, arguments for 
UK-based energy resources and infrastructures are 
often made in these terms. There are, of course, 
some advantages to the UK economy of reducing 
imports of fossil fuels due the impact on the 
balance of payments. However, it is important to 
remember that such imports sometimes bring 
economic benefits by allowing UK consumers to 
access cheaper resources from abroad and/or by 
improving the diversity of supplies.
Such arguments have come to the fore recently 
in the debates about shale gas.  As discussed in 
section 4.2, whether the UK becomes a major 
producer of shale gas is currently very uncertain. 
In principle, UK shale development could help 
strengthen UK energy security by diversifying the 
sources of gas for UK consumers – but it is unlikely 
to have a significant impact on energy prices and 
bills because the UK is closely integrated with the 
large European gas market. However, shale gas is 
extremely controversial in the UK. As this report 
has argued (see section 4.4), UKERC’s research has 
found that the development of new sources of 
fossil fuel such as shale gas could conflict with one 
or more underlying values about the kind of energy 
system publics wish to see.
A key lesson from this research is that any plans 
to develop new forms of energy such as shale gas 
should not be taken for granted by government. 
They should be subject to genuine consultation 
and public engagement – and should be discussed 
in the context of broader energy system change.
Affordability
Low-carbon energy is currently more expensive 
than fossil fuels, although the price gap has 
recently narrowed substantially for, especially, 
onshore wind (in respect of the wholesale price) 
and solar photovoltaics (in respect of the retail 
price). For this price reduction to continue, and 
for it to spread to other technologies such as 
offshore wind, the widespread deployment of these 
technologies will need to be sustained.
Inevitability, this will put costs on energy 
consumers or taxpayers in the short to medium 
term. But, as noted above, the projected costs 
associated with low-carbon energy are estimated 
to be only around £135 per household per year 
in 2020, about the same as the average house 
insurance, as the current Chairman of the CCC has 
pointed out. As section 4.6 explains, this estimate 
depends on a number of assumptions, not least 
that government policies for energy efficiency will 
be strengthened. But viewed as insurance against 
the risks associated with climate change, most 
recently expressed by the IPCC in its report on 
projected climate change impacts (IPCC, 2014), this 
should be considered to be very good value.
For poorer households and trade-exposed 
energy-intensive businesses, however, the extra 
costs of low-carbon energy may represent a 
significant challenge, and this challenge needs 
to be seriously assessed and properly addressed. 
The means of doing this effectively, and without 
undesired unintended consequences, are likely 
to be complex and the details cannot be explored 
here. It is certain that energy efficiency measures 
will be a major part of the solution, as noted 
above, as will direct reductions of energy bills for 
vulnerable households (the Warm Home Discount). 
For businesses, rebates with Climate Change 
Agreements will also continue to be important. 
There is considerable international experience in 
this area which can inform UK policy.
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It should be emphasised that the affordability 
challenge is likely to be time-limited if current 
plans for a low-carbon transition are realised. If 
renewables come down in cost relative to fossil 
fuels, energy efficiency programmes are effective 
and there is genuine public engagement about the 
direction of change, the additional costs added 
to current energy bills could come to be regarded 
as one of the best investments in both secure 
and affordable energy that this country could 
make. As this would also mean the UK making 
a fair contribution to reducing global carbon 
emissions and thereby mitigating climate change, 
these investments would in addition be globally 
beneficial beyond the UK. The investments would 
mean that the UK is playing is full part in global 
efforts to reduce emissions. It would also be an act 
of global leadership, and would substantiate the 
aspirations of successive governments for the UK 
to make the transition to a low-carbon society.
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